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MIKHAIL MINAKOV 
The Language of Dystopia 
The Ideological Situation in Ukraine 
Since independence, Ukrainian J?Olitical discourse has come to he 
dominated by a language that facilitates state control over a static 
conjiYmtation between regionally based tonservatisms, each moted in its 
own historically conditioned sense of ressentiment. 
Today, as in the past, Ukraine is a field of struggle between state and 
country~-and not, as many think, between West and East or between 
Europe and Russia. By ancient pan-Russian tradition, the culturally, 
regionally, and ethnically diverse country is an attractive target for the 
power elite and for state institutions, which from century to century try 
to establish control over the land and over the minds of the people who 
inhabit it. By the same tradition, the country extricates itself, hides in the 
shadows from vigilant eyes and greedy hands, and buys its freedom with 
bribes, destroying the state's effectiveness with a saving corruption. The 
age-old struggle between the power elite and the subordinated population 
began, if we are to believe the chronicles, with the Norse invasion, and 
it continues. There is no end to it! 
As always, the options and motives of the warring sides are not the 
same. The country tries to survive and to preserve itself and its web of 
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traditions, which are often unspoken and invisible to the mind of the 
statesman. The state, for its part, strives to legitimize the supremacy of its 
own interests by all available means. The state has an important advantage 
in this confrontation: the self-descriptive language of the contemporary 
world works in its favor. The nomenclature of this language operates 
with binary oppositions of the Manichean kind. Only phenomena that 
have a dual nature are susceptible to political verbalization: the struggle 
between western and eastern Ukraine, the cultural confrontation between 
linguistic groups, geopolitical orientation toward Moscow or Brussels. 
In the language of "either-or" there is no place for a "third path," for 
horizontal relations and neutral decisions. 
Two Conservatisms 
The language of our contemporary world and its fundamental grammar 
make the struggle between the country and the state imperceptible. It 
seems that the very structure of this language is designed to divert our gaze 
from what really exists. The tension of the Ukrainian ideological field is 
created by the binary oppositions of the language of the contemporary 
world. These oppositions determine its lexical norms, which create an 
articulable--and therefore also visible---reality. Because of the gram-
mar and lexicon of contemporary language, the state, not the country, 
offers value orientations for sociopolitical interaction. This offering is 
meager, confined to two conservatisms, based on the country's cultural 
"breaks"-on the ressentiments of the people who populate Ukraine's 
expanses. 
In this context, I interpret ressentiment as a special sociopsychic 
process that unites substantial groups of people and is generated by 
shared traumatic experience. Ressentiment is a component of collective 
memory, a sort of pain of remembrance whose cause is articulated in 
terms of some actual, inescapably but unjustly co-present Other. It does 
not matter whether the trauma itself existed in reality; the important 
point is that it is remembered--and remembered in such a way that it 
creates in large groups a feeling of unity in political or social action. The 
traumatic experience builds up over a fairly long period, becoming a sort 
of superego that prescribes for affected personalities (that is, for people 
who accept an identity based on ressentiment) a definite, emotionally 
colored appraisal of any significant social phenomenon. Gradually the 
ressentiment becomes a standard for judging events and a meaningful 
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cultural compass. It exe1ts influence not only on appraisals of past social 
experience but also on expectations of a shared future. 
As a rule, ressentiment is a self-reproducing pain experienced by a 
person who has assumed one or another collective identity with all its 
baggage. The dialectic of collective memory is based on the fact that 
the memory of trauma does not find direct realization and sublation in 
actions motivated by ressentiment. The irrational memory that bears the 
pain is always topical, renewed, and self-fortifying. This also strengthens 
the irrationality of political life, which manifests itself in the dominance 
of ideological constmcts that require the least critical thought or public 
display of substantive elements of social life. Such an ideological con-
struct in Ukraine has been conservatism, as an ideology that connects the 
collective memory of experienced pain with primordial cultural values 
and that requires group-often political-action to establish a utopian 
order that would abolish the causes of the pain. The power of ressenti-
rnent has led to the boundless dominance of conservatism as a logic of 
political action. 
For so long as society remains in search of the guilt laid on fellow 
citizens on the "other" side of the Dnieper, interspersed with temporary 
Pyrrhic victories of one of the hemispheres of the Ukrainian globe, the 
state can maintain undivided control over the lands that constitute the 
country of Ukraine. This general situation has come to be known as dys-
topia or anomie. As a dystopia, Ukraine has found itself in a place where 
any developmental impulse dies before it can set in motion a mechanism 
of irreversible change. As a state of anomie, Ukraine resides in a place 
where the values that make possible the act of social solidarity do not 
operate. Distrust, suspicion, and mutual disrespect make the Ukrainian 
dystopia a foundation of conservative beliefs. 
It is important to note that in itself conservative ideology is a necessary 
element in the political development of any country. Conservatism, by and 
large, is the credo of citizens who appeal to the need to defend "traditional 
values"-that is, certain significant goals of the social, religious, and 
ethnocultural type. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, cm1Ser-
vatism is a political ideology that justifies support for "institutions and 
practices that have evolved gradually and are manifestations of continuity 
and stability." 1 Once, in the heat of debate, John Stumt Mill called con-
servatives representatives of "the stupid party." Setting aside his political 
bias, we can nonetheless find a rational kernel in his words: conserva-
tives have little interest in real historical reflection on politics in general 
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and on the principles governing their own political activity in particular. 
Indeed, students t)f conservative ideology have developed a consensus, 
which Edward Green, for instance, articulates: "Conservative[s] desire 
to trust instinct and experience over intellect and reason in the discussion 
and shaping of their response to political issues."2 
The very name of this ideology indicates a strategy of protecting es-
tablished norms and values. But often this protection is largely a matter 
of convention, in that it pertains not so much to an existing order that 
for some reason is under threat as to an imaginary order that supposedly 
existed in the past and corresponded to some ideal condition of sociopo-
litical life of the given "nation." 
The state is seen here as the main instmment for restoring the ideal 
order. Michael Oakeshott has observed that conservatism "is tied to ... 
certain beliefs about the activity of governing and the instruments of 
government."3 He has also drawn attention to the irrationality of the con-
servative statist credo, in which "the intimations of government are to be 
found in ritual, not in religion or philosophy; in the enjoyment of orderly 
and peaceable behavior, not in the search for truth or perfection."'' 
Conservatism needs a state that in the name of stability will protect 
traditional values, customs, and institutions against change. 
A Common Language 
Due to the coexistence of conservatives with liberals and socialists 
within a shared political space, a given country may ensure its own stable 
development, thanks in part to the competing political offerings. Such 
competition generates diverse and divergent solutions, giving citizens 
grounds for choosing goals and means of overcoming socioeconomic 
problems. In addition, the contest of ideologies permits various ethnic, 
religious, and other significant groups to create their own ecological 
niches. Inescapable competition limits the capacity of any single ideol-
ogy to shape the life of citizens, helping them understand that the state 
is merely one means of satisfying their needs. Ideological competition 
is a guarantee of balanced social change, enabling critical intelligence 
and respect for tradition to keep society in a condition acceptable to 
individuals and groups. 
Until 2004 Ukraine preserved a political pluralism within which na-
tionalists, socialists, and sporadically arising liberal groups balanced one 
another. After the events somewhat hastily named the Orange Revolution, 
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however, the Ukrainian political space converted itself into a "conserva-
tive situation." For this reason, since 2005 our self-descriptive lexicon 
has reverted to ancient conservative concepts. Instead of increasingly 
complex political communication conditioned by ideological competition 
and by an evolving political logic, we have seen ideological simplifica-
tion, diverse forms of political reasoning and worldviews reduced to a 
single semantic field. The political debates during the elections of 2007 
and 2009--10 confirmed the persistence and vitality of this trend. Com-
pensating for the unipolarity of the ideological field, political antagonism 
in Ukraine characterizes relations not among ideological opponents but 
between territories. 
Although the undivided dominance of conservatism encompasses 
the entire country, its two halves live under the influence of different 
types of res sentiment. Our lands have diverged in political confrontation 
under the impact of two traumatic experiences of the twentieth century. 
The trauma of western Ukraine is associated with the tragic experience 
of rural communities in which the decisive factor was forcible and ac-
celerated "Soviet modernization," combined with the "ethnocultural 
loneliness" that emerged as a consequence of the Holocaust and of the 
postwar transborder resettlement of Poles and Ukrainians. This trauma 
was manifested in the fixation of social attention on the imagined ethnic 
component of political events. For the eastem and southern Ukrainian 
lands, the trauma was associated with civil war, industrialization, col-
lectivization, the Holodomor [famine of 1932-33-Trans.), and Nazi 
occupation. This trauma emphasizes the nonethnic social component. The 
two ressentiments address themselves to different collective memories 
and lead to a dystopian political confrontation that goes beyond rational 
bounds. In this way, they prepare the soil for the coexistence of two types 
of conservatism: one calling for the preservation of illusory agrarian 
and tribal traditions of "state building" and based on self-isolation and a 
monoethnic vision of the country; the other characterized by a desire to 
protect Soviet "achievements" and to overcome ethnicity, coupled with 
a post-Soviet incomprehension of the potential of civil society. Neither 
supports its founding principles or intentions by critical examination or 
public discussion. 
Over the two decades of Ukrainian independence-for local cultures, 
a time of heightened reactions to vital challenges---a common language 
has arisen. Designed to avoid touching both eastern and western sore 
spots, it is incapable of describing the unique experiences of culturallv 
4R RUSSIAN POLITICS AND LAW 
diverse regional communities. This language sets the rules for the lin-
guistic game of dystopia. At the same time, it fully con·esponds to the 
state's desire to establish control over citizens and their (existing and 
possible) associations within Ukrainian borders. An interesting point is 
that this language fully satisfies neither the Soviet--industrial East nor 
the nationalist-agrarian West. Since it emerged in the 1990s, it has been 
able to sustain a minimal viability for the dystopian political system. 
But although this language is intended to hold ressentiments in check, 
it constantly reproduces and strengthens them. 
The clash of conservatisms never ameliorates political conti·ontation or 
solves the vital problems of Ukrainian society. The conservative lexicon 
refers to a logic in which exclusivity prevails over inclusivity. The state 
and the elite benefit from this exclusive language, which sustains the 
dystopia that enables the state to keep the country under control. It does 
little, however, in terms of building a civil society and modernizing the 
country. Within this language's area of operation, people cannot attain 
a rational consensus that provides space for political competition, but 
they can maintain a consensus based on the state's interest~-that is, on 
a conservative ideology that exalts and strengthens the state. The state 
becomes an authority that makes endless demands on the citizen and 
interferes in the most delicate spheres of human life-including the 
matter of ethnic, linguistic, and religious identity. 
Viktor Yushchenko's attempts to base Ukrainian statehood on ethnic 
nationalism further exacerbated the discord between the sections of 
Ukraine. Nationalism, regarded as a swear word in the 1980s and the 
1990s, acquired a legitimate place in Ukrainian political discourse. Its 
supporters among intellectuals and politicians assert that it remains the 
sole means of overcoming the burdens of imperialism and therefore the 
main instrument of social modernization. Although the first argument 
had some justification, the second assertion, which lacked theoretical 
substantiation from the start, was discredited in practice by the gover-
nance of the "Orange" team in 2005~9. 
The Struggle Between the State and the Country 
According to the nationalist credo-as formulated by the Romanian 
historian Vladimir Tismaneanu, a dominant influence on East European 
intellectuals-----the mission of nationalism is to legitimize the new coun-
tries that emerged after the collapse of the communist bloc." Nationalism, 
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thus understood, has succeeded in sm11e places, although-in the Balkans, 
for example-at an incredibly high price. In Ukraine ethnic nationalism 
has strengthened ressentiment, weakened the sociopolitical structures that 
maintain the unity of the country, and contributed to the demodemization 
of Ukrainian society. 
The attempt to affirm a new political identity for Ukrainian citizens 
with the aid of state institutions has led to the formation of a special 
rhetoric that parliamentary parties regularly use in appealing to the 
electorate. The logic of this kind of communication is based on es-
sentialism--the attitude that treats race, ethnicity, gender, and class as 
eternal substances that possess a fixed set of key characteristics. In the 
political rhetoric of Ukraine, this logic manifests itself in discussion of 
the ontological differences between and fundamental incompatibility of 
Occident and Orient, the Kiev and Moscow patriarchates, or "eastem" 
and "western" Ukrainians. Normative value is ascribed here to only one 
of these "essences"; phenomena with the opposite characteristics are a 
priori abnormal, incorrect, and threatening. 
Conservative thinking based on an essentialist logic results in the ap-
praisal of political events and the planning of political actions according 
to the "ours--not ours" [svoe-chuzhoe] criterion. Here "ours" is invariably 
ascribed moderately positive and "not ours" radically negative charac-
teristics. Constant use of this scale leads citizens to a special type of 
political action in which the issue of responsibility, as a rule, never finds 
a concrete addressee. By referring to an ontological system of values, 
conservatism simplifies political judgment; not ours is always to blame 
for the defects and problems of the contemporary world, never ours. In 
estranging the other, an individual imagines himself in terms of authentic 
affiliation with an exclusive, rooted group whose characteristics appear 
as his own ontological structures. 
Taking into consideration this stmcture and derivative rhetoric of politi-
cal judgment, I can offer a different interpretation of the contemporary 
political--cultural situation, which at the beginning of the present article 
I called a struggle between the state and the country. This metaphor con-
tains an aspect that requires clarification. By "country" l have in mind 
groups of citizens; various cultural, geographical, and social communi-
ties; and civil society as a whole-groups whose interests the state fails to 
address and often ignores. "State," in this context, refers to the authority 
constituted by institutions and political structures serving the purpose 
of holding on to power, property, and control over the population. Thus, 
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according to the logic of this conceptual metaphor, one of the state's 
most important functions is to reproduce the conditions under which 
conservative thinking flourishes; this in turn enables the state to remain 
as it is. In ensuring control over the bulk of resources, the activity of the 
state authorities stops the normal development of everything that does 
not fit the nomenclature of their thought and speech. 
Under such circumstances, the public application of reason damages 
the state and frees the country. Hostility to the public application of reason 
is quite typical of the Ukrainian political community, but since the events 
of late 2004, leaders and parties have insisted on avoiding discussion of 
ce1tain themes and consistently following the "official line." The Law on 
the Holodomor that was adopted on 28 November 2006 first atticulated 
this prohibition. Article 2 states: "The public expression of skepticism 
regarding the Holodomor of 1932-33 in Ukraine is deemed an outrage 
against the memory of the millions of victims of the Holodomor and an 
insult to the dignity of the Ukrainian nation and is illegal."6 
Essentially the same logic guides discussions about the Organization 
of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA), 
and the Red Army during World War II. The arguments are solely about 
who should be regarded as a hero---not about what feats of heroism were 
performed, what crimes were committed, what requital the participants 
in these events received, or how a person was to survive in the slaugh-
terhouse of war. Debates not connected with history proceed in the same 
key. The political actions of President Viktor Yushchenko, who in 2007 
disbanded parliament on dubious grounds, or of President Viktor Yanu-
kovych, who in 2010 created a governing coalition on an equally shaky 
foundation, are appraised solely on the basis of pany affiliation-without 
drawing any political or rational conclusion. Violation of the mles in 
relations between the state and the country does not delegitirnize the 
state but merely compels the country to believe less and less in rational 
solutions. Whoever may head the "state," this authority resists the public 
application of reason. 
The state's success in its struggle against the country reflects the ease 
with which it can manipulate disconnected and mutually estranged citi-
zens who have no opportunity to use rational argumentation in the public 
space. It is simpler for the state authorities to appeal to the emotions 
and suppress rational principles, and this makes Ukrainian social and 
political institutions less and less modern. Ukraine is rapidly losing not 
only the industrial legacy of the Soviet Union but also the achievements 
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in the cultural, social, and political spheres that have their origin in the 
enthusiasm of perestroika. 
Ukraine in a Panic 
A particularly notable type of irrational argumentation is the so-called 
''moral panic," which from time to time engulfs the political elite, in-
tellectuals, and a large proportion of politically active citizens. Under 
certain conditions, the public suddenly perceives some person or group 
in a wholly negative and alarmist light. According to Stanley Cohen's 
definition, a moral panic is a set of events defined by a substantial part 
of the population as "a threat to societal values and interests."7 Today 
we use this term to describe a public reaction determined by an incor-
rect or distmted perception of various events, minorities, or subcultures. 
Volodymyr Kulyk recently analyzed Ukraine's experience with moral 
panics.x His study describes many panics that have struck Ukrainian 
society. In terms of the present atiicle, however, I think it important to 
emphasize that the panics of the last decade in Ukraine have often led 
to protests by large social groups, who have demanded that the govern-
ment guard society against an approaching threat, even if that means 
restricting civil rights. 
Rooted in hidden cultural and social conflict, panics have become part 
of the arsenal of political technologists--the magicians of the contempo-
rary world, who know how to channel the energy of ressentiments toward 
the attainment of their clients' short-term political goals while worsen-
ing social division over the long term. I would note that the target of a 
panic is always formulated in moral terms, channeling people's energy 
into rage and not fear. In addition, panics arise out of apprehension not 
for life or prope1iy (here a rational reaction is needed) but for "moral 
values" of some kind. 
Over the last decade, panic has become a frequent guest in Ukraine. 
One example is provided by the events of 2005-6, when political debate 
focused on the idea of federalizing the country. At that time, the state, 
in the person of the president, cursed the very word "federalism" (sic!) 
and those who employed it in public discourse. The Communists and 
socialists now fall into a similar panic when they talk about integration 
into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The nationalist 
campaigns of 2007-9 discredited the Russian-speaking citizens of 
Ukraine as a deviant group that threatens the values of the "normal" 
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community of those who speak Ukrainian. Such incidents act as sur-
rogates for the rational, political, public communication that facilitates 
the development of modern political institutions. They appeal to the 
essentialist prejudices of large social groups and legitimize the often 
illegal actions of high officials and their entourages. 
By overpowering the country, the state acquires an exclusive right to 
distribute public goods and supremacy over its citizens. It dictates the 
logic of protecting its interests and subordinating civil liberties to state 
security; it neutralizes the influence of formal and regulatory institutions. 
This state of affairs is based on the absence of the rule of law, the weak-
ness and dependence of the courts, and disrespect for parliament. 
Even on a nonfinancial issue like the status of the Russian language 
in Ukraine, the state reserves for itself the right of final decision. The 
authorities believe that the main goal of contemporary language policy 
should be to develop in citizens a specific reflex that blocks productive 
public discussion and guarantees the state's "right" to formulate the high-
est values. In the absence of legal regulation, bureaucratic arbitrariness 
constantly threatens the linguistic and cultural rights of citizens who 
consider themselves members of large and small ethnocultural groups. 
For the time being, incompletely privatized Soviet factories and undivided 
land distract the power elite from cultural policy, but soon these resources 
will be exhausted. Then the situation will become dire, as our rulers act 
on their intentions with regard to the cultural sphere. 
With the domination of conservative political thinking that appeals 
to the two ressentiments, the relations between "eastei·n Ukraine" and 
"western Ukraine" look like a mechanism for the generation of constant 
and unavoidable en-ors.ln my opinion, the imagined communities of "our 
Russian-speaking East" and "our Ukrainian-speaking West," which lack 
a common language and universal means of discussing common issues, 
have prefetTed a strategy of revenge. The inhabitants of each region vote 
into the legislatures political forces that may not uphold their interests but 
can be relied on to exact revenge on those of their fellow citizens whom 
they consider their enemies. Of course, people do not say such things 
out loud, but the inhabitants of eastem Ukraine persistently elect to the 
highest posts politicians with a criminal past not so much in obedience 
to Cossack traditions as out of a desire to emphasize their disrespect for 
a state arrayed in ethnic "western" attire. Conversely, western Ukraine 
elects politicians who promise to expel all antistate forces from the 
political and social arena, so that Ukraine will at last stan to Jive "as it 
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should." This "lose-lose game" constantly reproduces the conditions 
for the territorial division of society, while the prize-in the form of 
control over the distribution of resources-always goes to the state and 
the power elite. 
In Lieu of an Afterword, or "What Is to Be Done?" 
In light of the above, we may say that the realization of at least a mini-
mally optimistic scenario for Ukraine's development requires change at 
two levels of our society. Above all, it is necessary to strengthen non-
conservative financial and political forces. This heading should include 
nonimitative neoliberals and neosociahsts. Conservative loneliness can be 
overcome if we put into practice the East Slavic custom of "sharing joy 
among three." We cannot, however, place any special hope in Ukraine's 
liberals; they are at present in a minority, and due to the degradation of 
Ukrainians' civic awareness their electoral appeal is fading. As for the 
socialists, the damage inflicted on Ukrainian society by the economic 
crisis may lead to extraterritorial solidarity within the social strata that 
have borne the greatest losses. Given the exclusivity of the economic 
policy conducted by the current government of Nikolai Azarov, which 
upholds the interests of big capital, I might argue that the socialists have 
a great future-at least, over the medium term. Bureaucratic arbitraiiness 
and a shortsighted state policy of redistributing social wealth in favor 
of 2--3 percent of the population must give rise to powerful resistance 
movements among latter-day "proletarians"-that is, those who no longer 
have anything to lose. 
Another area that requires radical change is the development of social 
institutions that strengthen the element of rationality in contemporary 
Ukrainian culture. I am speaking, above all, of the social sciences and 
the humanities. These disciplines are by nature inextricably connected 
with politics, and their evolution can contribute to modernizing political 
institutions. The current inclination of the Ukrainian elite toward con-
servatism is directly associated with the deficiencies of Soviet and post-
Soviet higher education in Ukraine. Critical rationality resides outside 
the research and educational system's area of interest Changes within 
this system might set in motion a long-term modernizing mechanism that 
would stimulate reform of the cultnral and political situation. Critical 
rationality can offer an alternative to conservative sympathies, and there-
fore the conservative dystopia is not inevitable. The underdevelopment 
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of political philosophy, theoretical sociology, and political science (not 
politology but precisely political science) is not only a product but also 
a cause of the flourishing of conservative practices. The weakness of 
the universities, which have been unable to resist the temptations of the 
market, and the confinement of academic research to the hard and natural 
sciences do not yet permit us to speak of impending innovations in the 
development of the social sciences and humanities. But without such in-
novations it is simply impossible to model for citizens and counterelites 
a different mode of political thinking. 
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